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CHAPTER I 
History of the Catilinarian Conspiracy. 
The first century B. c. marks what is 
probably one of the most interesting and exciting eras in 
history, likewise one of the bloodi8st and most unfortunate. 
For with the year 90 B.C. and the Social War, in which the 
Italian allies were forced to resort to arms in a vain at-
tempt to gain the franchise, came the first intimation that 
the structure of the great Roman Republic was crumbling. 
From the next blow Rome never fully recovered--the excesses 
of the popular leaders .Marius and Cinna and the consequent 
Civil War between Marius and Sulla. Sulla indeed was the 
eventual victor, and he reaped a bloody revenge. There 
followed in quick succession the insurrection in Spain under 
1 
Setorius and the rebellion at home of the consul Lepidus, 
the revolt of the slaves under Spartacus, and the last des-
perate struggles between Pompey and Caesar, Brutus and Au-
gustus, Augustus and Antony, until at the battle of Actium 
in 31 B.C. of the glorious republic that was Rome there re-
mained nothing but a shambles and a ruin. The conspiracy 
of Catiline was another in the long series of catastrophies 
that befell the Roman state. 
January 1, 65 B.C. was a day of marked 
unrest even in the Rome of those turbulent times. Armed 
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bands of men swept through the streets of the city, and 
there were rumors abroad of a plot to assasinate the consuls 
at the inaugural ceremonies that day. Crassus, the wealthiest 
2 
man in Rome, would then usurp the dictatorship, nominating 
inturn as his magister eguitum the young and ambitious Caius 
Julius Caesar. So the rumor ran. The time indeed was ripe 
for such an attempt, for with Pompey and the army busily 
engaged in far off Syria and Armenia, and the whole of Italy 
ungarrisoned, there was at Rome no force capable of suppress-
3 
ing any such organized outbreak. At the last moment, however, 
the whole affair fell through because Crassus for some un-
known reason failed to put in an appearance and Caesar was 
consequently prevented from giving the appointed signal to 
4 
the conspirators. ·what role Catiline played, whether he 
was really the moving spirit behind the whole affair or was 
merely acting as the tool of Crassus and Caesar is a question 
that will later command a more detailed treatment. At any 
rate, thus ended the fiasco known as the first or Minor Con-
spiracy of Catiline, so called because the second conspiracy 
was a direct outgrowth of this earlier one. 
Catiline had desired to run for the consul-
ship in 66 B.C., but was prevented from doing so because he 
was unable to present himself as a candidate within the le-
5 
gitimate number of days, since he was under an indictment 
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for the maladministration of his province when propraetor in 
Africa. Despite the clearest evidence against him, he was 
finally acquitted owing to the wholesale bribery and corrup-
6 
tion of the jurors and the praevaricatio or collusion of 
his accuser, the notorious P. Clodius Pulcher. Nothing 
daunted, he.again sued for the consulship in 64 B. c., this 
time in company with c. Antonius, a man of scarcely better 
reputation than his own, and, it is alleged, with the ready 
approbation and financial assistance of both Crassus and 
Caesar. It was, in fact, the fear inspired by tlus combinatio 
that induced the Senate and the nobles to throw their support 
to Cicero, Catilinets rival, much against their will, for 
Cicero was a "novus homo" while Catiline was descended from 
one of the ancient patrician families of Rome, that of the 
Sergii. Cicero and Antonius were elected consuls. Thereupon 
Cicero promptly purchased the good-will of r..is colleagus and 
a free hand in the management of affairs at Rome by resigning 
to .Antonius the rich province of Macedonia which had been 
alloted to him, in place of the less lucrative province of 
Gaul. Catiline, however, disappointed in his hopes of gaining 
by legitimate methods the power he desired, resolved upon a 
desperate expedient. He formulated a plot to overthrow the 
existing government and to mount the curule chair by blood 
and the sword if no other way was open to him. 
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With this intention of using force, he 
gathered about himself the worst elements in the city. Cicero 
in the Second Oration against Catiline, delivered to the 
people in the forum on November 8, gives a detailed inventory 
of the various groups that went to make up Catilinets follow-
ing. In the first place, there were the wealthy who were 
7 
submerged in debt and anxious for the Novae Tabulae or 
repudiation of all debts; secondly, the office seekers, men 
who wanted power and the chance to rule; thirdly, the veterans 
of Sulla, tired of fighting the soil and looking for new 
spoils and plunder; fourthly, the spendthrifts and bankrupts 
for whom any change was for the better; fiftluy, the rabble 
and riff-raff of the cityts slums, and, lastly, Catiline's 
more intimate associates and friends, including the reckless 
youths of the city whom Catiline had personally seduced and 
led astray. Among this last group was a certain Quintus 
Curius, an utterly untrustworthy individual, who to retain 
the favor of his mistress Fulvia, fell to boasting of his 
intended misdeeds. Fulvia in turn promptly reported her in-
formation to Cicero, and the latter secured her as his agent 
and spy. 
Alarmed by the reports of the plot, Cicero 
8 
convoked the Senate on October 21, 63 B.C. and informed them 
that he had reason to know that an armed outbreak was planned 
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for the 27th. of that month. The following day, October 22 
the Senate, aft~r considering the statement of the consul, 
passed the "ultimum Senatus Consultum" or, as it was termen, 
the "Extreme Decree", charging the consuls to take care that 
the commonwealth suffer no harm, conferring on them supreme 
power and inaugurating a state of martial law. Levies were 
likewise ordered throughoutitaly, and the consul Antonius 
9 
and the praetor Metellus Celer were directed to take the 
field against the insurgents, who, appeared in arms on October 
27 at Faesulae in Etruria under Gaius Manlius, a veteran 
centurion of Sulla and Catiline' s second in command. !'rot 
long after, Catiline was arraigned under the Plautian law, 
which was directed against acts of violence and breaches of 
the peace. He realized his affairs were becoming desperate 
and that he must act quickly. 
On the night, then, of November 6, at the 
home of Marcus Porcius Laeca in the street of the Scythe-
makers, he assembled his principal associates. First, he 
pledged them to faith and secrecy, and then rehearsed in de-
tail their two-fold plan---the firing of the city at several 
strategic points and the simultaneous advance on thecity of 
the army from Etruria under Manlius. According to the ac-
count of Sallust, the pledge was sealed by the drinking of a 
bowl of human blood mixed with wine. Concerning this episode 
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Plutarch in his life of Cicero giv8s an even more sensational 
account, but his story is uncorroborated, and would, in fact, 
seem to lack any foundation in reality. 
Before dismissing the assemblage Catiline 
explained to them how necessary it was for the success of 
their enter.prise that Cicero should be immediately dispatched. 
Gaius Cornelius, a Roman knight, and Lucius Vargunteius, a 
senator, volunteered to relieve Catiline of any anxiety on 
this score, and, since the meeting had been prolonged to the 
early hours, they set off a little later with their escort 
for Cicero's home, ostensibly to pay him the salutatio or 
ceremonial call. It had been agreed that the consul should 
be murdered as soon as they gained admittance to his room. 
Their mission, however, was unsuccessful. They arrived at 
their destination but were refused admittance because Cicero, 
10 
who had been forewarned of their coming through Fulvia, 
had summoned to his aid several of th~?. chief citizens of Rome, 
and had taken other measures to protect himself. That he 
was thoroughly alarmed, however, is evident from the fact 
that he called a meeting of the Senate on the next day not 
in the curia, but for greater protection, in the temple of 
Jupiter Stator on the Palatine. It was this occasion and 
the unexpected presence of Catiline that called forth the 
first of the four famous orations. 
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The first of the Catiline orations is, in 
brief, an expose of Catiline and his plan, and a command to 
the rebel leaders to depart from the city. ~~en Catiline, 
attempting a defense was howled down, he rushed from the 
11 
place in a rage threatening to head the leaderless mob. 
That night he fled the city, pretending he was going into 
exile at Marseilles, but, in reality, he headed directly 
for Faesulae and the camp of Manlius. On the following day, 
Cicero assembled the people in the forum and delivered the 
Second of his orations against Catiline, explaining to the 
people why Catiline had departed from the city, and begging 
his accomplices either to desist from their revolutionary 
attempts or to follow Catiline into exile. 
Meanwhile at Rome the praetor, Publius 
Cornelius Lentulus, who in the absence of Catiline had as-
sumed leadership of the conspirators, ha.d gathered together 
a force considered sufficient for their purposes. It was 
agreed that when Catiline had reached the camp of Manlius at 
12 
Faesulae, Lucius Bestia, a tribune of the plebs, should 
assemble the people in the forum with the intention of at-
tacking and denouncing Cicero. This was to be the signal 
for the others to carry out their various parts: Statilius 
and Gabinius with their followers were tofire the city at 
twelve important points, and in the confusion that would in-
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evitably result, Cethegus was to make his way to Cicero and 
slay him. 
Cicero, though well aware of the schemes 
that were afoot, had until this time been able to secure no 
definite and decisive evidence against Catiline and lus 
followers. At this juncture, however, fortune played right 
into his hands, placing in them the very evidence he needed. 
There happened to be in the city at this time certain envoys 
of the Allobroge~, a tribe in Transalpine Gaul, who had come 
to Rome to complain about the behavior of their governor. 
These envoys were approached by one Publius Umbrenus, an 
agent of Lentulus, in the hope of inducing them to join the 
13 
conspiracy. In return for the redress of their grievances 
and other substantial rewards, they were, on their return, to 
induce their people to revolt and to dispatch a squadron of 
cavalry to swell the growing forces of Catiline at Faesulae. 
The envoys, at this point, entertained 
certain doubts regarding the feasibility of the whole scheme. 
In their perplexity they laid the matter before their patron, 
Fabius Songa, who, in turn, relayed his information to Cicero. 
Here was Cicero's opportunity, and he decided to make the 
most of it. Summoning the envoys to himself, he bade them 
continue negotiations with the conspirators, instructing them 
at the same time to obtain if possible written documents 
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attesting the intentions of the followers of Catiline. 
Lentulus, Cethegus and Statilius fell headlong into the trap. 
oaths and pledges of faith were signed, sealed, and handed 
to the envoys. Among the documents was a letter from Lentulus 
to Catiline urging the latter to enlist the aid of slaves. 
By the evening of December 2 all their 
arrangements were complete, ~~d the Allobroges and their 
escort, accompanied by Titus, Volturcius, one of the conspira-
tors, stole silently out of the city. As they crossed the 
Mulvian bridge two miles north of Rome they were arrested by 
the forces which Cicero had planted there for that purpose. 
The Allobroges who were a party to the scheme quickly sub-
mitted, and Volturcius after a brief show of resistance quiet-
ly followed their example. The letters were seized and speed-
ily delivered to Cicero who declined to open them buX instead 
called an immediate meeting of the Senate in the temple of 
Concord, summoning thither Bethegus, Statilius, and Gabinius. 
He himself led in Lentulus by the hand. Volturcius, on the 
promise of a pardon, consented to reveal all he knew concern-
ing the conspirators and their plans, and lus testimony was 
confirmed by that of the Allobroges. But the most damaging 
evidence lay in the letters. Each of the accused was con-
fronted with his seal and forced to acknowledge it before the 
thread was cut. The letters which urged the Gallic tribe to 
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revolt were then read. The guilt of the accused was too 
manifest to be mistaken. By a unanimous vote Lentulus was 
requested to resign his praetorship, and then he and the 
other conspirators were ordered to be taken into custody. 
This was the occasion of Cicero's third oration against 
catiline. 
Meanwhile the freedmen and the dependents 
of Lentulus were scouring the streets of the city endeavor-
ing to rouse the artisans and the slaves to rescue him, 
while Cethegus was sending messages to his followers to 
gather arms and force their way to him. On hearing these 
ports Cicero again convoked the Senate to demand what he 
should do with the prisoners. Decimus Junius Silanus, the 
consul-elect and therefore the first to speak, recommended 
that they be put to death, but later, after the speech of 
Caesar, he retracted this opinion in favor of the proposal 
of Tiberius Nero who had merely advised that the guards be 
re-
increased and the question reopened. Caesar, however, when 
his turn came to speak, advised against departing from the 
traditions and customs of their forefathers by putting Roman 
citizens to deaht without the people's consent. He proposed 
instead that the accused be imprisoned for life in the various 
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municipal towns, and all their property confiscated. His 
speech evidently made a profound impression for Cicero felt 
obliged to rise and deliver lris fourth and last oration 
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against Catiline. 
He told his listeners that as far as he was 
concerned, the simpler proposition was that of Caesar, namely, 
life-imprisonment, but he commended the proposal of Silenus 
on the ground that traitors to their country had forfeited 
their rights as citizens. The majority of the Senate, how-
ever, were still in favor of Caesar's motion, when the stern 
and unbending Cato rose to speak. He assailed with charac-
teristic vigor all half-way measures, and demanded, a.s the 
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country's only salvation, the supreme penalty. His motion 
prevailed and that same day the prisoners were let down one 
by one into the Tullianum, the ancient prison of the kings, 
and strangled. On his way home Cicero addressed the anxious 
and curious people in what was probably the briefest speech 
of his career: nvixeruntn, nthey have lived their life". 
It was a march of triumph for Cicero. Torchlights flared in 
every doorway, and on all sides he was acclaimed the father 
and preserver of his country. 
The execution of Lentulus end his fellows 
broke the backbone of the conspiracy. A short time later in 
a pitched battle at Pistoria, some twenty miles from Faesulae, 
the remnants of Catilinets army were routed, but only at the 
cost of a terrific slaughter on both sides. Fighting val-
iantly in the van of his troops, and surrounded by the bodies 
of his foes, Catiline breathed his last, and the second 
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conspiracy was at an end. 
~-'----------------------------------~ 
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CHAPTER II 
Political Gangs at Rome 
Much that took place in the Rome of the first 
century B. C., and, more particularly, much that concerns 
the conspiracy of Catiline is inexplicable without some 
appreciation of the part played in Rome by the political 
gangs that harassed the last years of the dying republic. 
For it would be a serious mistake to identify the mongrel 
rabble that flocked after Catiline (Clodius, Milo and, Sestius 
with the glorious "Populi Romani" whose virtues and achieve-
ments Cicero never tires of lauding. Indeed, the man vv-ho had 
1 
inherited from Arpinum his fierce patriotism and tender love 
of Rome and his deep reverence and respect for her traditions 
and past glories never did himself greater violence than 
when he addressed this idel and corrupt mob with the proud 
title of "Populi Romani". This must be understood, however, 
not as a universal condemnation of the bulk of honest and 
patriotic citizens living in Rome and outside it, but of that 
noisy portion of the populace which though small in number 
dominated the popular assemblies, exercising an influence 
out of all proportion to their numbers. 
It had been apparent, however, for some 
time that the old Roman virtues were practiced not in Rome 
but outside it in the provinces which had but recently gained 
2-1 
the franchise. Furthermore, the city mob, though it may have 
included originally a small percentage of the honest and 
upright citizens, had in the last few years changed radically 
in character. It now included in its ranks large numbers of 
. 2 
foreigners ignorant of Rome and her patriotic and political 
traditions. For when Rome became the mistress of the world 
she also became the melting-pot of the world, into which 
flowed adventurers of every description till it could be said 
of her in the time of the empire that ninety percent of the 
3 
resident population of Rome was of foreign extraction. 
These strangers were, for the most part, slaves, but many of 
them were freedmen who enjoyed the right to vote. Their 
numbers were increased by the crowds of farmers who flocked 
to Rome at this time either because they had been Marian 
sympathizers and had been dispossessed of their land to make 
way for the veterans of Sulla, or because they were unable 
any longer to compete with slave labor. They preferred instead 
to roam idle through the streets of Rome, whither they had 
been lured by the promise of cheap food at the expense of the 
state. In later years the soldiers of Sulla finding the life 
of colonial farmers uncongenial to their tastes drifted slowly 
back to Rome. 
It seems, however, that the greatest single 
contributing factor to the social and economic distress of the 
~-----------------------------------------------------------------, 
-
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city was the slave population. Though the number of slaves 
at Rome can never be accurately determined, they seem beyond 
all doubt to have formed a considerable part of the population. 
pompey and Caesar alone are roughly estimated to have sent 
4 
over a million human beings under the yoke. "long lines of 
chained prisoners from Germany, Gaul, and even Britain", says 
I)Uruy, "were led to Rome. Utica and Egypt furnished blacks; 
Numidia, swift runners; Alexandria, grammarians; Sidone and 
cyprus, those intelligent, docile and corrupt Asiatics so 
highly prized as house servants; Greece, her handsome boys 
and girls; Epirus and Illyria, the most experienced shepherds; 
Germany, Gaul and Thrace, the most savage gladiators; Cappa-
dacia, the most patient laborers". 
The result of this slavery was disastrous 
for the moral and social as well as the economic life of the 
city. · The thrifty and hardy Roman for all his contempt for 
oriental pomp and ease, fell a willing victim before the 
seductive and talented slave of the East, often his superior 
in culture and learning. Before long the slaves had gained 
the ascendency in the greater part of the professions. They 
were the doctors and the teachers, the artists and the musi-
cians, the tutors and the writers. The gladiators formed a 
class apart and it was but natural that men whose business it 
was to kill-and be killed at the pleasure of a fickle mob 
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should contribute much to the disorder and confusion of the 
city. It was, in fact, the custom to remove them from the 
city in times of danger. 
The greatest harm, however, wrought by the 
slaves was that in Rome, as in all slave states, labor came 
to bear the stigma of disgrace. The ordinary citizen chose 
to stand hungry and idle in the streets rather than work, 
preferring to be fed, feasted, and entertained at the expense 
of the state, even when work was available, which was not 
often the case, for the cheap slave labor forced them from 
their jobs into the ranks of the unemployed. It was impossi-
ble to compete with slave labor especially when the slaves 
were worked in gangs and hired out in groups by their ov.ners. 
It was this last evil and its specific application to the 
large scale plantation that emptied the rural districts into 
Rome. When the slave was no longer profitable he could be 
conveniently granted his freedom, and cast off on the state. 
Manumissions of this sort did much to swell the turbulent and 
discontented elements of the city. 
All these evils might have been present a.nd 
yet have worked no appreciable difference in the political 
life of the city were it not for one peculiar feature of 
Roman politics---the lack of permanent party organizations 
at Rome. Voters followed a leader rather than a political 
2-4 
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principle. The appeal of any particular candidate for office 
lay not so much in any definite political platform as in his 
own individual and personal qualifications. Strictly speak-
ing, there were at Rome no rival political parties as we 
know them today. Though there were knights and nobles and 
plebs and senators, yet it was not a contest between knight 
and senator for the consulship. The consulship, it was under-
stood, remained strictly within the charmed circle of the 
senatorial order, and rarely in the long history of the re-
public was this tradition violated, notable exceptions were 
Cicero and his fellow townsman Marius. Since the individual 
then played so important a role in Roman politics, it was 
essential that he should gather around himself as many ad-
herents as possible. For this purpose he was accustomed 
to equip himself with a large and handsome retinue. A 
favorable impression was thereby created and generally the 
importance of the candidate and the strenght of his cause 
could be gauged by the size of his escort. 
There was, naturally, among office seekers 
a fierce rivalry to gain the favor and votes of the mob, 
who, as a rule, sold their votes to the highest bidder. 
Conditions, indeed, had not changed much in tb.e time of 
7 
Juvenal, who termed the people's right of suffrage the 
privilege of selling their votes. It was when bribery and 
~----------------------------------------------------· 
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corruption and the gentler methods of persuasion had failed 
that the political gangs demonstrated their unusual effect-
iveness. Every sword in the candidate's retinue came to 
signify so many more votes, since the peaceful elements in 
the community could usually be induced to vote as their more 
desperate fellows indicated. 
Coincident with the change in. the character 
of the Roman mob, there appears on the stage of Roman politics 
8 
a new character whom Rolfe terms the "political bossn. He 
divides the political boss into three types: the higher type, 
of whom Marius, Sulla and Caesar are specimens; the lower 
type who does not aspire to the higher offices, but who con-
trols the votes and is able to "deliver the goods"; and, 
"a middle type symbolized in Clodius and Milo, who attained 
high office without rising to the lughest grades but who 
pushed the fortunes of other men, or dragged down their 
enemies". It is to this lower and middle type that we have 
reference when we speak of the political gangster. It was 
to be expected.that the urban rabble would fall under the 
leadership of such men, who organized them into guilds and 
political clubs called sodali tates or collegia sodalacia .• 
These were, in fact, little more than escort gangs. Origin-
ally, the collegia had comprised the various religious 
brotherhoods and associations banded together in this manner 
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for the celebration of some special cultus, but, gradually, 
they had lost their sacred character, and, at this time, 
they served merely as a pretext for arming the worst elements 
in the city. Any type of organization rendered them terribly 
effective, particularly for purposes of bribery and coercion. 
After the political gangs ·had been suppressed 
10 
it was Clodius who revived them. Caesar on his ascent ot . 
power in 47 B. c. supressed them again. Though it was against 
the law for a citizen to carry arms within the city, these 
bands of swordsmen swept through the streets doing exactly as 
they pleased since there was at Rome no regular police force 
to see that the law was observed. During the last days of the 
republic they had no doubt become a permanent feature in 
Roman politics, and, it may have been in the capacity of a 
gang leader that Crassus and Caesar first made use of Catiline. 
No one, however, seems to have organized them so effectively 
and on so grand a scale as Clodius and Milo. It was by the 
aid of precisely such means that Clodius succeeded in forcing 
through the laws that resulted in the exile of Cicero. As 
early as 62 B. c. when there was a bill before the assembly 
to try Clodius in connection with his profanation of the rites 
of the Bona Dea, Clodius surrounded the ballot boxes with his 
armed ruffians, and succeeded in breaking up the meeting with-
11 
out a vote. The great Pompey, though he liked to consider 
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himself the first man in Rome, hardly dared at one time to 
venture out of his house for fear of Clodius and his gangsters, 
They were harassing him at the instigation probably of Crassus, 
pompey's bitter rival. It was only after Milo with his own 
band of hired assassins had engaged Clodius in a prolonged 
series of brawls and street fights that the assembly was able 
to meet and pass the bill recalling Cicero. The senate on 
this occasion voted a sum of money to rebuild Cicero's house, 
but Clodius and his gang drove off the workmen and burned 
down the house of Cicero's brother next door. 
After the departure of Crassus for the East, 
a reconciliation was effected between Pompey and Clodius. 
When Milo, therefore, ran for the consulship in 52 B. C1• 
much against the will of Pompey, Clodius had an added motive 
for attacking him. Milo replied in kind by hiring several 
rival gangs and the war was on. Rome was the scene of one 
riot after another, and street fighting became the order of 
the day. The elections, of course, were rendered impossible 
so that this state of anarchy might have continued indefinite-
ly had it not been for the memorable meeting between Clodius 
and Milo on the Appian Way near Bovillae some ten miles from 
Rome, when the swordsmen of Milo after an encounter in V~:hich 
they came off victorious, dragged the wounded Clodius from 
a tavern into the road and murdered him. 
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Pandemonium broke loose in Rome when it was 
announced to the rabble that Clodius had been slain. Tbey 
besieged the senate house and heaping up the benches they 
laid on this improvised pyre the body of their idol, burning 
the senate house to the ground in their grief. Meanwhile 
the gangs of Clodius, on the pretext of looking for Milo 
and his friends, were busy burning and pillaging. At length, 
to prevent further disorders, Pompey was recalled and made 
sole consul, which was just what he desired. Since there 
was no one at Rome to hire them now, the gangs became super-
fluous; so Rome sat back to watch the struggle between Pompey 
and Caesar who were playing for .much greater stakes this time 
and with armies instead of gangs. 
2-9 
NOTES TO ca~TER II 
1. Cf. Boissier, Gaston, Ciceron et Ses Amis, p. 70. 
2. Cf. Heitland, W. E., The Roman Republic, Vol. 3, p. 501. 
3. Cf. Abbot, Roman Politics, p. 144. 
4. Cf. Harperts Classical Dictionary, article, "servus", 
p. 1453. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Abbot, £2• cit., p. 
7. Juvenal, Sat.,x, 1, 77. 
8. Rolfe, Cicero and F~s Influence, p. 21. 
9. Cf. Harperts Classical Dictionary, articles: ttsod.alacia" 
and "ambitus". 
10. Heitland, ~ cit., pp. 146-178. 
11. Marsh, Frank Burr, "The Gangster in Roman Politics", 
in Classical Journal, Vol. xxviii, Dec. 1932, 
p. 161. 
CHAPTER III 
Catilinets Guilt in the First Conspiracy 
This thesis, it may be well to remark, is in 
no sense of the word an apologia or defense of Catiline. A 
number of such defenses have been attempted, none with more 
notable success probably than that of Professor E. s. Beesley, 
which first appeared in the Fortnightly Review and has since 
been reprinted. Unfortunately most of Professor Beesley's 
conclusions have since been discredited and his essay makes 
1 
interesting, if not altogether satisfactory, reading. This 
thesis is, however, an attempt to determine and estimate the 
extent of Catilinets guilt, using as a basis of judgment the 
the accounts of the conspiracy handed down by Cicero and Sal-
lust. 
Our efforts will be confined principally to 
the texts of Sallust and Cicero because the "Bellum Catilinae" 
of the former and the "Four Orations of Cicero against Cati-
line" are the chief sources from which our reliable information 
of the conspiracy is drived. The history of the Catilinarian 
conspiracy as found in the subsequent authorities--Plutarch, 
Appian, Suetonius, Dion Cassius, Florus and Paterculus--does 
not differ essentially from the accounts of Sallust and Cicero. 
Nothing, indeed, can be more certain than the fact that in 
Rome in the year 63 B.C. there was a conspiracy, and that the 
~------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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leader of this conspiracy was a notorious individual, by name, 
Lucius Catilina. The precise guilt of Catiline, however, and 
the exact blame that attaches to him for his share in the plot, 
is not quite so evident. Cicero, of course, has tried to 
immortalize him as public enemy no. 1 in the rogues gallery 
of the Roman Republic. On the one hand it may be that Cati-
line was not so black as he is generally painted; on the other 
hand,_ perhaps, he was more so. It is our purpose to find out 
whether and to what degree Catiline may be acquitted or con-
victed of the charges brought against him. 
We shall have gone far in our efforts to 
determine the precise guilt of Catiline if we can assign him 
his rightful role in the first conspiracy of 66 B. c. As is 
evident, the crime of Catiline is rendered more heinous and 
his guilt more obvious if we find that as early as 66 B. c., 
three years before the major conspiracy, Catiline had already 
led several unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the government. 
On such a hypothesis the major conspiracy was not the result 
of some sudden and desperate resolve, but the fruit of three 
years of scheming and planning. On the other hand, his guilt 
is somewhat diminished if we find, instead, that the plot of 
66 B. c. which supposedly comprised the two attempts on Janu-
ary 1, and February 5, was in all probability not repeated on 
February 5, as Sallust claims and secondly, that Catiline was 
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merely acting as the instrument of Crassus and Caesar, and 
played, therefore, a rather minor role in the whole affair. 
Both Cicero and Sallust give us very unsat-
isfactory accounts of this first conspiracy. Sallust alone 
of all the authorities makes any mention of a second attempt 
on February 5. If, as we intend to show, Crassus and Caesar 
were the real leaders in this conspiracy, it quite contradicts 
what we know of Caesar and his established policies and me-
thods to say that he would risk a second failure so soon after 
the first. Moreover, if, as Mommsen claims, "from the passing 
of the Gabinio-Manilian laws down to the return of Pompey 
2 
there was perpetual conspiracy in Rome", it would seem only 
reasonable to adopt the conclusion of Professor E. G. Hardy, 
who had given us probably the finest treatment to date of this 
vexing question, that it is well "in the complete absence of 
all other mention of this second and more atrocious plot, to 
dismiss it as irresponsible rumor carelessly repeated by 
3 
Sallust". The most convincing piece of evidence, however, 
that this second attempt never took place is the fact that 
Cicero in his account of the first conspiracy, at a moment 
when he is violently inveighing against Catiline and raking up 
all sorts of charges against him both true and false, fails 
to make even the slightest reference to this damaging bit of 
4 
information. 
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The truth of the matter is that both Sallust 
and Cicero are at evident pains to avoid all mention of eras-
sus and Caesar in connection with the affair. Sallust as an 
avowed partisan of Caesar and the acknowledged recipient of 
innumerable favors at his hands would naturally shrink from 
introducing the name of his dead chief in so odious a venture. 
Cicero for obvious reasons would not care to antagonize the 
two greatest men in Rome at a time when his own position was 
so precarious. For the orations against Catiline ~'ere written, 
it must be recalled, some three years after the conspiracy 
when the first burst of enthusiasm had subsided and a popu-
lar reaction had set in against Cicero for his share in the 
execution of Lentulus and his fellows. Plutarch in his life 
of Caesar tells us expressly that Cicero "voluntarily over-
looked and neglected the evidence against him (Caesar) for 
fear of bis friends and power for it was very evident to 
everybody that if Caesar was to be accused with the conspira-
tors, they were more likely to be saved with him, than he to 
5 
be punished with them". 
Suetonius, however, had no such motives for 
being reticent, and in no uncertain terms he tells us that 
Caesar "venit in suspicionem conspirasse ~ Marco Crasso 
consulari, ~ Publio Sulla et L. ftntonio post designatioem 
consulatus ambitus condemnatis, ut principio anni senatum 
r' 
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adorirentur, et trucidatis guos placitum esset, dictaturam 
crassus invaderet, opse ab ~ magister eguitum diceretur 
constituague ad arbitrium ~ publica Sullae et Antonio QQg-
6 
sulatus restitueretur". Unlike Sallust in his treatment of 
this particular question, Suetonius immediately proceeds to 
quote his authorities: "Meminerunt hujus conjurationis 
Lanusius Geminus in historia, Marcus Bibulus in edictis, c. 
curio pater in orationibus", and he adds that Cicero too had 
7 
hinted as much in a letter to Axius. 
A good deal of mystery still attaches to this 
first conspiracy. If the affair were as simple as Cicero and 
Sallust would have us believe, why were the conspirators never 
brought to trail, and why the seemingly tacit agreement on all 
sides that the matter be dropped as quickly and as quietly 
as possible? VI'hen we conpare the account of Sallust with 
what actually did transpire in Rome after the failure of the 
conspiracy, we are faced vvith some very remarkable conclusions. 
The story of the first conspiracy as told by Sallust is as 
follows: 
"Sed antea item conjuravere paucii contra rem publicam 
in quis Catilina fuit; de qua verissime potero dicam. 
L. Tullo et M. Lepido consulibus P. ftntonius et P. Sulla 
designati consules legibus ambitus interrogati poenas 
dederant •••••••••••••••• Erat eodem tempore Cn. Piso, 
adulescens nobilis, summae audaciae, egens, factiosus, 
quem ad purturbandam rem publicam inopia atque mali 
mores stimulabant. Cum hoc Catilina et Antonius cir-
citer nonas Decenbris consilio communicate parabant in 
Capitolio kalendis Januariis L. Cottam et L. Torquatum 
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consules interficere, ipsi fascibus correptis Pisonem 
cum exercitu ad obtinendas duas Hispanias mittere".8 
catiline and Antonius then were to kill the consuls Cotta 
and Torquatus, and Piso was to be sent with an army into 
Spain. The attempt was a miserable fiasco. But lo and be-
hold, a few months later we find Torquatus actually defending 
9 
catiline against a charge of repetundae and Piso by a decree 
of the Senate marching off to Spain with an army. Cicero is 
our witness for the first statement in his speech in behalf 
of Sulla, another of the conspirators: 
"Quin etiam parens tuus, Torquate, consul reo de pecunJ.J.s 
repetundis Catilinae fuit advocatus, improbo homini et 
supplici, fortasse audaci et aliquando amico. CUi cum 
adfuit post delatam ad eum primam illam conjurationem, 
indicavit se audisse aliquid non credidisse". 10 
The second statement quoted above is testi-
fied by Sallust himself, who immediately after telling us 
that it was part of the conspirators plan that Piso should 
be sent to Spain with an army, has this to say: "Postea Piso 
in citeriorem Hispaniam auaestor pro praetore missus est 
adnitente Grasso, quod eum infestum inimicum en. Pompeio 
cognoverat".ll In that little sentence we have probably the 
key to the whole first conspiracy. From it we are able to 
conclude to the moving spirits behind the whole affair, 
Crassus and Caesar, for Sallust seems not to have understood 
that he could not cast suspicion on Crassus without at the 
12 
same time implicating Caesar. 
3-6 
Crassus and Caesar had joined 
forces out of fear of Pompey who, it was expected, would 
attempt to set up a military dictatorship on his return to 
Rome from his brilliant campaigns in the East. 
One move in the game of Crassus and Caesar 
to checkFOmpey was to put in the consulship men like Catiline 
and Antonius whom they could manipulate without too much 
difficulty. Another move was to send Piso, Pompey's deadly 
enemy, to Spain with an army. That was the original plan of 
the conspiracy and though it fai~ed miserably, still Crassus 
was powerful enough and wealthy enough to force the Senate to 
send Piso to Spain after all, and not only that, but to en-
dow him with praetorian powers as well. This is confirmed 
by Asconius in his commentary on Cicero's lost election speech 
"In Toga Candida" in which Cicero makes the following 
- , 
statement: "Dico, P. c. super.iore nocte cu,1usdam hominis 
nobilis et valde in hoc largitionis guaestu noti et cogniti 
domum Catilinam et Antonium cum seguestribus suis convenissen • 
.Asconius makes the following commentary: 
"Aut c. Caesaris aut M. Crassi domum significat, ei 
enim accerrimi ac potentissimi fuerunt Ciceronis re-
fragatores, cum petiit consulatum, quod ejus in dies 
civilem crescere dignitatem animadvertebant; et hoc 
ipse Cicero in expositione conciliorum suorum signi-
ficat. Sed ejus quoque conjurationis, quae Cotta et 
Torquato coss. ante annum quam haec dicerentur facta 
est a Catilina et Pisone, arguit M. Crassum auctorem 
fuisse".l3 
3-7 
sallust in lus attempt to clear Caesar's name of suspicion, 
magnifies naturally Catilinets share in the proceedings. He 
is prompted by no such consideration with regard to Crassus: 
"Fuere item ea tempestate aui crederent M. Licinium 
Crassum non ignarum ejus ~Catilinae) consilii fuisse, 
quia Cn. Pompeius invisus ipsi magnum exercitum dicta-
bat, cujusvis opes voluisse contra illius potentiam 
crescere, simul confisum, si conjuratio valuisset, 
facile apud illos principem se fore."l4 
Caesar's connection with the conspiracy was 
equally notorious. Caesar and Crassus ~vere extremely anxious 
at this time to get their hands on Egypt, the richest country 
in the East, and in the advent of trouble with Pompey an 
invaluable base of operations. With men of the stamp of Cati-
line and Antonius in the consulship, their scheme stood some 
chance of realization. What other uses they would have made 
of Catiline we can only conjecture. We have a few indications, 
however, in Titus Labienus who proposed the bill restoring the 
election of the Chief Pontiff to the people instead of the 
college of Pontiffs, and thereby secured the victory of Caesar 
over his formidable rivals Catulus and Servilius. .Another 
tool of Caesar and Crassus, the tribune Servilius Rullus was 
employed to introduce a measure which if carried would have 
given them the power and the money and the armies they wanted. 
It was the famed Agrarian Law for the distribution of land to 
the poor, the money to purchase the land being raised by the 
sale of government property in nine different provinces. The 
, 
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law was to be administered by ten commissioners invested with 
military power for a space of five years. Caesar of course, 
would head this commission, only the measure was defeated by 
the efforts of Cicero. 
These facts are important as showing where 
the balance of power lay in Rome, and what the relations must 
necessarily have been between Crassus and Caesar on the one 
side and Catiline on the other. Catiline was clearly the 
tool. It was with the evident intention of making some such 
use of him that Caesar as president of the commission that 
was trying those accused of performing the wholesale execution~ 
for Sulla a.llowed the rest to be condemned, but the most 
16 
patently guilty of all, Catiline, to be acquitted. Rome, 
however, was not deceived. Later when the second conspiracy 
was at its height, Mommsen tells us that·nthe young men who 
had taken up arms to ward off the incendiaries were exasper-
ated against no one so much as against Caesar; on the fifth 
of December when he left the Senate they pointed their swords 
at his breast and he narrowly escaped with his life even now 
on the same spot where the fatal blow fell on him seventeen 
years afterwards; he did not again for a considerable time 
17 
enter the senate house." At the trial of the conspirators 
when Caesar had spoken against the death penalty and made 
a profound impression on his listeners, Plutarch tells us 
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that "the first man who spoke against Caesar's notion was 
catulus Lutatius. Cato followed and so vehemently urged in 
his speech the strong suspicion about Caesar himself and so 
filled the senate with anger and resolution that a decree was 
18 
passed for the execution of the conspirators." 
The hand of Caesar, like that of Crassus, 
was too manifest to be mistaken. But at the same time the 
influence of Caesar like that of Crassus was powerful enough 
to discourage any proceedings that might be taken against him. 
Crassus, it will be remembered, had been seriously implicated 
by the testimony of Tarquinius. Though many believed in the 
guilt of Crassus still the testimony against him had been 
stricken from the records and Tarquinius instead bundled off 
19 
to prison. Even though Crassus was guilty, it was considered 
a much wiser and safer policy to propitiate re.ther than exas-
perate him at such a crisis. All tlus being true it rnigbt 
well be questioned with what amount of fairness, considering 
the relative parts played by Catiline and the powerful com-
bination of Caesar and Crassus, the name of Catiline has come 
to be attached to this "First Conspiracy of Catiline". Clear-
ly he can have been no more than a minor and subordinate fi-
gure. It is highly significant that Suetonius in his account 
of the first conspiracy does not even mention the name of 
20 
Catiline. 
r--------------------------------~ 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Evidence in Cicero for Ce.tiline's Guilt 
In the present chapter our efforts will 
be mainly confined to a consideration of the evidence ad-
vanced by Cicero, for and against the guilt of Catiline, in 
in his four famous orations. There is question here of 
Catiline's guilt with regard to the conspiracy i.e. precisely 
how great or how little blame attaches to him as a conspirator. 
This will however necessarily entail some discussion of the 
further question of Catilinets private life and morals. Littl 
need be said in behalf of the case presented by Cicero against 
Catiline. We need only remark that so complete and masterful 
was the task performed by Cicero that he has secured for 
Catiline an immorte.li ty, which, questionable as it is, the 
latter could never have achieved by his own efforts. It is 
an eloquent commentary on the skill of Cicero, end a wonderful 
tribute to his genius that succeeding generations have hardly 
dared to question the judgment he pronounced against Catiline. 
Amid a welter of facts, and details and data incontestible, 
Cicero has proved beyond all doubt that in the year 63 B. c. 
there was a movement afoot in Rome against the government, 
a conspiracy, if you like, and that the leader of this move-
ment was Catiline. If one chooses to view Catiline solely 
through the eyes of Cicero, the case is closed and Catiline 
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·was just about the worst wretch that has ever graced this 
earth. But when Catiline is viewed through the eyes of a 
ttdrd person, a.nd the implied statement weighed and balanced 
against the explicit, the case against him is not quite so 
obvious and terrible. We see much at times in the very words 
of Cicero that at a first glance might escape us. We find 
at times certain details left unexplained. Some of these 
we shall attempt to solve. For our explanation we claim, 
not that it is the only one or the commonly accepted one or 
the best possible one but merely, that, given the circumstan-
ces, it is a reasonable one and a quite plausible one. It 
is in this frame of mind that we now look at the four orations 
delivered by Cicero when the conspiracy was at its height. 
The time of the composition a.nd deli very 
of the four orations is of course extremely important. Had 
they been written some fifteen years or so after the crisis 
had passed and the conspiracy was no longer a live issue, 
we should expect to find even Cicero less violent in his 
denunciations of Catiline. As a matter of fact, the speeches 
as we have them were not written till some three years after 
the conspiracy when it was Cicero's avowed object to depict 
Catiline in as lurid a light as possible. A reaction had set 
in against Cicero, as has been already mentioned, for the part 
he had played in putting the conspirators to death. These 
speeches were, therefore, as much a defense of Cicerots own 
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policy as an arraigment of Catiline. It must be apparent 
that Cicero's best defense lay in emphasizing and elaborating 
the guilt of the conspirators. This was, of course, particu-
larly true of Catiline not only as leader of the opposition 
but as the symbol of that whole side of Roman life which 
Cicero hated and condemned. For these reasons we must be 
somewhat cautious and critical in our interpretation of what 
Cicero has to say of Catiline and attempt to estimate the 
latter's guilt more by the content of what Cicero has to say 
than the highly rhetorical manner in which he says it. 
At the precise time the first oration against 
catiline was delivered (Nov.s, 63 B. c. ) Cicero was striving 
desperately to convince the authorities at Rome that this 
conspiracy was to be taken seriously and that this Catiline 
was in reality a dangerous character. Thelast point most of 
them would have been quite willing to concede. Cicero faced 
a much stiffer task, however, in the attempt to convince them 
that Catiline was a serious menace to the safety of the city 
as a whole. His own words are a virtual admission of this 
fact. nouamguam n2E. nulli sunt in hoc ordine gui aut ~ ouae 
imminent B2n videant aut ea guae vident dissimuent; gui spem 
Catilinae mollibus sententiis ~lluerunt conjurationemque 
1 
crescentem ~ credendo conroboraveruntn. Earlier in the 
same speech he had confessed as much when he declared: 
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"Si te jam, Catilina, comprehendi, si interfici jussero, 
credo, erit verendum mihi non potius hoc ornnes bbni 
serius a me quam quisquam crudelius factum esse dicat. 
Verum ego hoc quod non jam pridem factum esse oportuit 
certa de causa nondum adducor ut faciam".2 
The "certain reason " why Cicero did not dare to take any 
definite steps against Catiline was the fact that these good 
citizens either did not as yet take Catilinets attempt at a 
revolution aeriously, or else they were not disinclined to 
view with an indulgent eye a scheme that in any way appeared 
to challenge Pompey. In either case Catiline could not have 
seemed to them the revolutionary abomination that Cicero 
pretends; in fact, they were quite likely to welcome a move-
ment tr~t promised resistance to Pompey. 
It was only when the people realized that 
the movement was directed against themselves that they took 
any pains to suppress the conspiracy. For already the several 
classes in Rome had begun to regret the excessive powers they 
had themselves placed in Pompey's hands by the passage of the 
Manilian and Gabinian laws. As Mommsen says: "never since 
Rome stood had such powers been united in the hands of a singlE 
3 
man." Pompey was now by reason of his victories over the 
pirates and Mithradates virtual commander of the Roman forces 
on land and sea. Rome was consequently in a state of feverish 
anxiety waiting to see what use the great soldier would make 
of lus dictatorial powers when he grew tired of making and 
unmaking monarchs in the East. 
r 
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The aristocratic oligarchy in Rome feared 
Pompey as a threat to their supremacy and the popular party 
with which Pompey was presumably allied realized that it now 
had in Pompey an ally too powerful for its ovm good. The 
senate and the optimates were willing to go any lengths in 
their toleration of Catiline if only they might thereby off-
set in some manner the advantages of Pompey. This is clearly 
shown by the fact that they sent the quaestor Gnaeus Piso 
with an army to Spain with praetoria:n powers, simply because 
of the deadly enmity that was known .to exist between himself 
and Pompey, although Piso was a notorious intimate of Catiline 
4 
and had been implicated with him in the first cdnspiracy. 
It must be apparent, then, that to convince 
this audience which might be inclined to treat in somewhat 
cavalier fashion the charges against Catiline, Cicero' was 
forced to tax his resources to their utmost, and to leave 
unsaid nothing that could be construed to Catilinets disad-
vantage. This is no unfair reflection on Cicero, for in his 
speech Pro Cluentio he himself expressly warns us against 
accepting as historical facts the charges he might chance to 
urge against anyone, guided as he was by the exigencies and 
the circumstances of each particular case: 
nsed errat vehementer, si quis in orationibus nostris, 
quae in judiciis habuimus, auctoritates nostras con-
signatas se habere arbitratur. Omnes enim illae ora-
tiones causarum ac temporum sunt, non hominum ipsorum 
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aut patronorum. nam si causae opsae pro se loqui 
possent, nemo adhiberet orationem."5 
That we have interpreted these words in 
their true sense, we quote in proof Professor E. G. Sihler 
who writes in this connection, "He ( Clu 139) positively 
refeses within the sphere of his professional conduct or 
procedure to be bound or constrained by any published utter-
ance of the past. An advocate cannot maintain genuine con-
sistency in dealing with the shifting and changeful cases 
which he undertakes. He is necessarily (Clu 139) determined 
6 
by the case in hand and by the circumstances attending it!! 
Cicero himself, later on openly boasted that in this particu-
lar case he had thrown dust into the eyes of the jury. A 
distinction must be drawn between the genuine sincerity of 
Cicero, the Roman patriot and the occasional special pleading 
of Cicero, the Roman lawyer and rhetorician. It is our task 
to get behind the rhetoric and the invective and to let the 
facts speak for themselves. 
The first oration against Catiline is to a 
large extent an impassioned appeal to Catiline to leave the 
city. This is the motif and it occurs time and time again 
with singular insistence: "egredere aliqoamdo £X urbe, patent 
Eortae, Erofisciscere ••••••• sin tu, quod te jamdudum hortor, 
exieris •••••• exire ~ urbe jubet consul host em. interroga.s 
me num in exsilium? nQg jubeo, sed si ~ consulis, suadeo ••• 
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••••••• guam ob ~ discede atque hunc mihi timorem reipe ••••• 
••••••• quae~ ita sint, Catilina, dubitas, si emori aequo 
animo !l2!2 potes, abire ••••••••• egredere ~ urbe, Catilina," 
and so on through the rest of the speech we find Cicero 
begging, persuading and ultimately forcing Catiline to leave 
7 
the cit. 
Why was Cicero so anxious that Catiline 
depart safely from the city when he had already arraigned 
him in sustained passages of invective as a desperado and 
criminal whose freedom was a menace to the state? Why was 
Catiline not summarily arrested and thrown into prison or at 
least incapacitated in some way frum wreaking further harm 
on the state? Certainly Cicero never dreamt for a moment 
that his pleas to Catiline to abandon his ostensibly wicked 
designs had made the slightest impression on him. Nor do 
the reasons Cicero gives for not seizing Catiline and putting 
him to death seem entirely satisfactory. Neither the "customs 
of their ancestors" nor the "laws regarding the punishment of 
Roman Citizensn would have caused Cicero any serious scruples 
as he himself admits, for; npersaepe etiam privati in hac 
8 
ll publica perniciosus civis mote multarunt," and as re-
gards punishing Roman citizens, why: "numguam in hac urbe 
9 
oui 3! .!:..§.publica defecerunt civium jura tenuerunt.n He 
did not hesitate a few weeks later to put Lentulus, Cethegus, 
r 
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Gabinius, Caeparius and Statilius to death without a formal 
trial although they were Roman citizens and the law demanded 
10 
it. The third reason Cicero gives, "the odium of posterity" 
might well have been a consideration with him, but we can be 
sure that Cicero in his recital of the events would take good 
care that no odium should reflect upon himself. We should 
expect hardly less of a man whose supreme ambition lay not 
in the amassing of wealth or in the exercising of authority 
but in the winning of admiration. 
lf,'e cannot help suspecting, however, that 
Cicero's real reason for not apprehending Catiline was the 
simple fact that Catiline had not as_yet committed any overt 
act that would justify such behaviour on Cicerots part, or if 
he had, that Cicero had not clear evidence of the fact. This 
would also explain the unexpected presence of Catiline in the 
senate on this particular day for even Cicero does not appear 
to ha.ve suspected him of such daring. But Ca.tiline knew and 
Cicero knew that as long as the former could keep up a bold 
front in the city he was safe. If, however, Catiline could 
be driven out of the city he had no other recourse but to go 
to the camp of Manlius and once he did the conspiracy was a 
fait accompli and Cicero had won. Cicero had hinted as · 
much when he declared: "Nunc intelligo, si iste, .0J:!2. intendit, 
in Manliana castra pervenerit, neminem tam stultum fore qui 
, 
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non videat conjurationem ~ factam, neminem tam imnrobum 
- 11 
aui non fateatur." ~ --- ~--~~~ 
It was, as a matter of fact, in just some 
such manner that events actually transpired. Catiline had 
entered the senate and with the utmost coolness had taken 
his customary seat in their midst, but gradually as Cicero 
fired one denunciation after another at Catiliners head, those 
sitting closest to him, fearing to draw Cicero's attention to 
themselves, had quietly removed to a safe distance. Sitting 
alone in the crowded senate chamber, and listening to the 
merciless invective directed against him by the greatest ora-
tor in Rome, Catiline had finally betrayed himself. Rising 
to his feet to answer Cicerors charges he had been howled 
down, till at length mad with fury and raging under the in-
sults heaped upon him by Cicero, he had rushed out of the 
place shouting that: "since he was driven desperate by his 
enemies, he would extinguish his fire by general devastation." 
12 Cicero had forced lus hand and that night Catiline left 
Rome for the camp of Manlius. Cicero could now proceed again-
st Catiline as a declared enemy of the state, and since in 
virtue of the extraordinary powers conferred upon him by the 
senatus Consultum ultimum, his fielf of action was unlimited, 
it is not hard to understand why Catiline lost no time in 
fleeing the city. It is, at any rate, the opinion of Pater-
culus that: "Catilina metu consularis imperii urbe pulsus 
13 
est." 
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What conclusion are v;-e to draw? Not that 
Catiline was not a conspirator for a conspirator he certainly 
was but merely this conclusion that if Cicero h~~~d to force 
Catiline into open rebellion in order to convince the majority 
of Rome to take the conspiracy seriously, then this is hardly 
in accord with the traditional picture originated by Cicero 
of a Catilinewith pallid face and bloodshot eyes who roamed 
the streets of Rome breathing incendia scelera, caedes,~­
ricidia, latrocinia,etc. This of course does not exculpate 
Catiline from the charge of conspiracy. It does not lessen 
his guilt. It merely gives us cause for pause. Either 
Catiline was a much more clever individual than we have been 
led to believe and if he was, how explain his hesitancy, the 
childish parade of-lictors, the melodramatic speeches, drink-
ing of blood, etc.---or else he was not entirely the monster 
that Cicero has painted him. The point we are making is that 
Cicero was designedly confusing two separate issues--he was 
convincing his listeners of the heinousness of the conspiracy 
with a recital of theheinousness of Catilinets private char-
acter. 
We are of course dealing here only with 
Catiline's guilt in connection with the conspiracy, and it 
must be confessed that once he had proceeded to the camp of 
r 
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Manlius, there could be little doubt relative to that. 
Regarding the charges leveled by Cicero against Catilinets 
private life, it would not be amiss to say something here 
since our judgment of Catiline and the conspiracy has been 
so largely influenced by the terrible stories of his private 
life and while we have no reason to doubt their validity, 
this however must be said. Catiline lived in an age remark-
able in history for the utter abandon with which charges of 
the most outrageous nature were freely bandied about. Courts 
for cases of slander and libel were unknown so one could 
accuse his enemy of whatever crimes he chose and not fear the 
consequences. The only defense was to retaliate in kind, 
with the result that neither side was believed nor even ex-
pected to be believed • Such a state of affairs was the logi-
cal outgrowth of the legal training of the day. The budding 
orator or lawyer was taught to color his case, to render 
heinous the most insignificant faults of his adversary and 
even, if need be, to slip in a few useful lies here and there. 
The procedure was transfered with the greatest facility from 
the school to the platform and the courtroom. 
"On sait " says Bossj.er "oue les advocats de Rome nthesit~ient gu~e A charges les gens qutils pour 
suivaient de crimes imaginaires ••••••••• Ils ne pren-
aient m~me pas toujours la peine dtinventer un crime 
nouveau, cree tout expres pour la circonstance et 
approprie au personage; il y en avait qui servaient 
pour tout les occasions. Quand la caus~ se~blait un 
peu maigre et ne fournissait pas assez a L'eloquence 
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de ltavocat, il ne se faisait aucun scrupule d'y joindre une bonne accusation dtassassinat. cr~tait 
devenu une habitude, nous dit simplement Ciceron."l4 
Cicero elsewhere refers to such proceedings as the law of 
accusations, the lex accusatoris: in another place he refers 
to the mendaciuncula. 
The accusations mentioned above received 
the ready approbation of even the most prominent men. Quintus 
Cicero, in his treatise, De Petitione Consulatus, advises 
his brother to: "contrive if possible, to get some new 
scandal started against your rivals (Catiline and Antonius) 
for crime or immorality or corruption, according to their 
character." Professor T. Rice Holmes tells us that "this 
15 
last injunction Cicero diligently observed." To us who 
read the catalogue of Catilinarian crimes, Catiline appears 
somewhat of a monster, but to the ordinary Roman who knew 
how to subtract and divide what was said, he would in all 
probability have appeared not much worse than his fellows. 
Catiline could not have seemed to his con-
temporaries a wholly bad character for he enjoyed evidently 
the acquaintance of some of the most outstanding m~n in Rome, 
among them the noble and upright Quintus Catulus. It was to 
Catulus, as he was going to his doom, that Catiline entruste0 
his wife Orestilla in the very last words that are known to 
16 
have come from his pen. Cicero himself professes to have 
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found some admirable traits in Catiline. In the midst of the 
violent denunciations he hurled ag~inst his rival Catiline in 
the election speech, In Toga Candida, and the charges which 
he later repeated in a still more aggravated form in the 
Catilinarians, Cicero still found something to praise in his 
17 
adversary. 
Five years later when the conspiracy was no 
longer a live issue Cicero in lus speecn, Pro Caelio, makes 
some references to Catiline that are even more surprising. 
Defending Caelius against the charges of having-been too in-
timate with Catiline, Cicero uses these words with regard to 
Catiline: 
"Illa vero, judices, in illo homine mirabilia fuerunt, 
comprehendere multos amicitia, tueri obsequio, cum 
omnibus communicare, quod habebat, servire temporibus 
suorum onmium pecunia, gratia labore corporis, scelere 
etiam si opus esset, et audacia versare suam naturam et 
regere ad tempus atque hue et illuc torquere ac flec-
tere cum tristivus severe, cum remissis jucunde, cum 
-senibus graviter, cum juventute comiter, cum facinero-
sis audacter,"l8 
and a few lines further on: 
"Me ipsum, me, inquam, quondam paene ille decepit, cum 
et civis mihi bonus et optumi cujusque cupidus et firmus 
amicus ac fideliter videretur; cujus ego facinora oculis 
priusquam opinione, manibus ante quam suspicione de-
prehendi."l9 
Cicero, in fact, seems to have been so com-
pletely deceived that he even contemplated defending Catiline 
when he was being tried for malfeasance in office in order 
r ---------------------------------------------------. 
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that he might secure Catilinets aid in his quest for the con-
sulship. 
"Hoc tempre, Catilinam competitorem nostrum defendere 
cogitamus; judices habemus quos voluimus, summa accusa-
toris voluntate. Spero, si absolutus erit, conjuncti-
orem illum nobis fore in ratione petitionis; sin aliter 
acciderit, humaniter feremus."20 
Thus in this letter to Atticus we find Cicero, in the first 
kno'vn reference he makes to Catiline preparing if need be to 
bear manfully the loss of Catilinets friendship. Some have 
even believed that Cicero actually did defend Catiline, no-
table Fenestella, but most authorities seem inclined to adopt 
the position of Asconius, in his commentary on the In Toga 
Candida: 
"defensus est Catilina, ut Fenestella tradit, a M. 
Cicerone quod ego ut addubitem haec ipsa Ciceronis 
oratio facit, maxirne quod is nullam mentionem rei 
habet, cum potuerit invidiam facere competitiori tam 
turpiter adv'3rsus se coeunti. 11 21 
It seems evident at any rate that even Cicero had not always 
regarded Catiline as the traditional bete noire of Rome. 
The third and fourth Catilinarian in as far 
as they directly affect Catiline add little to the condem-
nation that Cicero ha0 already pronounced against him in the 
first and second orations. The third orati(Jn delivered be-
fore the people on December 3 is largely a narration of how 
Cicero with the aid of the Allobroges had trapped the leaders 
of the conspiracy in Rome. The fourth is concernedwLth the 
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punishment that is to be inflicted on them. We, therefore, 
turn, our attention to the second oration delivered before 
the people on November 9. It is for the most part an ar-
raignment of Catiline and his associates and contains the 
famous catalogue of Catilinets accomplices. It was Cicero's 
object to throw discredit on Catiline and his movement by 
holding up to ridicule the elements on which it rested, and 
in this he had succeeded. It is interesting to note however, 
that all six classes mentioned by Cicero have some connection, 
either proximate or remote, with the universal evil of the 
day--debt. Knights, senators, gamblers, bankrupts, spend-
thrigts, paupers, idlers, soldiers,--they ha1 but one thing 
in common, the misery and the anxiety of the debtor. It was 
the promise of the Novae Tabulae and repudiation of debts 
that drew them round the standard of Catiline. They were 
a class whose allegiance was valuable neither to the optimates 
nor the popular party. This would explain why they fared 
badly at the hands of the two traditional parties and their 
leaders, but would not on that account make this third party 
a necessarily disreputable one, except in the eyes of its 
enemies. The above classification of Catiline's followers, 
it must be remembered, is Cicero's. Any disrepute lay not 
in the fact that they ';,ere debtors bm that they were small 
debtors. There was scarcely an eminent man of the day again-
4-15 
st whom this charge could not be leveled, including Cicero's 
own followers. According to the severe regulations of the 
times regarding mortgages, if a debtor was unable to meet his 
obligations punctue.lly, even if it were only the interest on 
his debt, the creditor was entitled to take possession of the 
22 
mortgaged property. One can readily imagine the countless 
number of debtors such a measure would breed even amongst the 
wealthy senatoris.l class who were no longer capable of rais-
ing the huge sums necessary for the maintenance of their 
hereditary estates. The case of Caesar is of course notori-
ous. Even if we ·discount the figure quoted by PlutBrch, 1300 
talents, his debts must have been prodigious--and this before 
he had held any public office. The imputation of debt there-
fore was not sometlung peculiar to the party of Catiline alon~ 
Ca tiline, in fa.ct, was extremely sollici tous about the good 
name of his enterprise. Throughout the v.'hole course of the 
conspir!;l-CY his actions tend to show "that desperate though 
his plight might be, he felt that he had a respectable cause· 
23 
and was determined to keep it so.n 
One of the most significant acts of Catiline 
in this direction was his refusal to enlist the aid of slaves. 
It has been remarked already how numerous these slaves were 
in Rome and what a. constantly disturbing factor they proved 
in the maintenance of order within the city. It can be seen 
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at a glance what a welcome contribution they v,·ould have ma.de 
to the slender forces Catiline had at his disposal. Only a 
few years previous these slaves had risen under Sparts.cus and 
had succeeded for a time in terrigying the whole Italian 
peninsula while holding at bay the armies of several Roman 
magistrates. They only fell before the superior might of 
24 
Crassus and Pompey. 
To the very end Catiline was adamant in his 
refusal to enroll slaves, despite the entreaties of the other 
leaders at Rome, particularly Lentulus. The following is a 
copy of the letter which Lentulus sent Catili~e, only to have 
it intercepted by Cicero: 
TTQuis sim ex eo quem ad te misi cognosces. 
in quanta calamitate sis, et memineris te 
consideres quae tuae rationes postulent. 
ab omnibus, etiam ab infimis,n 
and adds Sallust: 
Fac cogites 
virum esse 
-~.uxili urn petas 
TTAd hoc mandata verbis dat; cum ab senatu hostis ju-
dicatus sit, quo consilio servitia repudiet.n25 
Still later when Catiline was being besieged by the army 
of Antonius and was in sore need of recruits, he still re-
fused the a.id of the slaves vvho flocked to him in large num-
bers. Sallust says: 
nrnterea servitia repudiabat, cujus initio ad eum rnagnae 
copiae concurrebant, opibus conjurationis fretus, simul 
alienum suis rationibus existimans videri causam ci.vium 
cum servis fugitivis communicavisse.H26 
That Catiline evidently considered his cause 
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an honorable one we may conclude from Cicero's own words in 
the second oration where he tells us that Catiline had sent 
in advance to the camp of Manlius, among other things; nfas-
cis, tubas, signa militaria, aquilam illam argenteam." Now 
no sane man at an extreme crisis of ~~s life--least of all a 
man like Catiline--is going to burden himself with a lot of 
ceremonial clap trap and appendages unless he had some serious 
purpose in view. It was evidently CatilineTs intention by the 
use of these traditional insignia of authority to impress upon 
his followers as well as upon the rest of Italy the honesty 
and legitimacy of the cause he had undertaken. For the fas-
ces were originally the emblem of the kings absolute authority 
over life and limb, and as such had passed over to the Roman 
magistrates as the symbol of soverign power. The aquila ar-
gentea referred to v.as the insignia of Marius, the great popu-
lar hero and was intended to earn for Catiline the sympathy 
and support of the common people. It was also designed to 
gain the assistance of the rural provinces, on which Catiline 
was counting heavily for men and arms, for it was through the 
efforts of Marius and the tribune Sulpicius Rufus that the 
Italian allies had been enrolled among the tribes • 'R ~n _,orne. 
All this tended to cloak the designs of Catiline in respecta-
bility. To say that Catiline believed his cause a good one 
is fa.r from claiming that the cause he espoused was objective-
r.-------------------------------~ 
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ly a good one. We have no evidence, not even from the pen of 
Cicero, that Catiline did not sincerely believe in the cause 
for which he was prepared to risk everything. His actions on 
this point at least, are surprisingly consistent. True, the 
instruments he used were anything but respectable but Cat.iline 
was a desperate man and he had recourse to such methods only 
when he· saw that the legitimate approa.ches to his design were 
closed to him. He had seen himself worsted time after time 
by the equestrian monied interests and the influence they 
could buy. For we must remember that Catiline was defeated 
in his quest for the consulship by only. a few votes that 
had been marshalled against lurn by the equestrians and their 
friends. If Catiline is accused of importing voters into the 
city, the same is true of his enemies in a greater degree. 
On that day many nobles and knights "who had never appeared 
in the Campus Martius in their lives came with set and anxious 
faces to the voting booths followed by a procession of friends 
and clients. The voting was very close b~tonce more money 
27 
had overcome numbers." 
Cicero, moreover, was subseauently proven 
wrong in the slurs he cast on the morale of Catilinets asso-
ciates and their loyalty to him. Cicero referring to them 
had ostentatiously declared: "quibus ego !12!1 modo si aciem 
exercitus nostri, verum etiam si edictum praetoris ostendero, 
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concident.n Cicero's grim little joke was not without its 
point f'or in his edict the praetor was accustomed to lay down 
the laws he would observe in arranging the proceedings of the 
regular courts for the coming year and in deciding cases not 
covered by the twelve tables. Cicero thought that a joking 
reference to its contents might be enough to discourage the 
more timorous of Catiline's followers. He was wrong however 
for they did fall eventually at the battle of Pistoria but 
not at the praetor's edict. They wrote, in fact, the noblest 
chapter in Catilinets life, for says Sallust: 
"confecto proelio tum vero cerneres quanta audacia 
quantaque animi vis fuisset in exercitu Catilinae. 
nam fere quem quisque vivos pugnando locum ceperat, 
eum amissa anima corpore tegebat ••••••••• postremo ex 
omni copia neque in proelio neque in fuga quisquam 
civis ingenuus captus est; ita cuncti suae hostiumque 
vitae juxta perpercerant.n29 
Ev'en before this time, when the senate had 
pronounced Catiline and Manlius traitors and had voted that 
an army should be levied immediately to pursue Catiline, we 
learn from Sallust: "~ tanta multitudine negue praemio 
inductus conjurationem patefacerat neque ~ castris· Catilinae 
30 
quisauam omnium discesserat. n It might rea.dily be constru-
ed then as sometlung of a tribute to the character of Catiline 
as well as his associates that despite the fact that t.hey 
were one and all heavily in debt, not one came forv.rard to 
testify against Catiline and claim the promised rewards. For 
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the senate had voted various rewards at this time to anyone 
volunteering information about the plot, to a slave, his 
freedom and a hundred thousand sesterces, and to a free man, 
with immunity from complicity, two hundred thousand sesterces. 
31 The awards, however, went unclaimed. This is a_ rather 
remarkable circumstance if as Cicero tells us, Catiline was 
so universal an object of hate and his associates so utterly 
abandoned. It is a fact that might have gone unmentioned. 
It does not make Catiline any less a conspirator but it does 
help toward giving us a fairer less distorted and therefore 
truer picture of that conspirator. 
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CHAPTER V 
The Evidence For Catilinets Guilt in Sallust. 
As with Cicero, so with Sallust an analysis 
must be made of the historian's attitude towards Catiline if 
we are to form a true judgment of Catilinets guilt. In this 
way we shall consider not only vvhat is said by Sallust about 
Catiline, but, by reading between the lines, much of what is 
often left unsaid. For Sallust in the Bellum Catilinae has 
sketched for us a picture of Catiline blacker if anything 
than that painted by Cicero. Yet a closer scrutiny of his 
picture reveals just enough light touches here and there to 
leave us with the unmistakable impression that Catiline was 
after all not entirely base, and that the wicked and per-
verse qualities in his character were not unaccompanied by 
some admirable and redeeming traits that affect his character 
both as a comspirator and a private citizen. Sallust's 
portrait of Catiline, however, as has been remarked, is far 
from flattering. He repeats in substance the same charges 
against Catiline that Cicero had made years before. He 
mentions, for example, Catilinets passion for Aurelia Ores-
tilla at whose bidding Catiline was supposed to have mur-
dered his own stepson, but with this qualification, "so it 
is generally believed." In another place repeating Cicero's 
accusation against Catiline of personally corrupting the 
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young men of the city, Sallust nullifies the whole charge 
when he admits that the report had become current not through 
any real evidence 11 sed ~ aliis rebus, magis guam guod cui-
2 
guam id compertum foret, haec fama valebat." In other words, 
this charge also was the result not of any real proof, but 
still another ncreditur." It appears as such and no more 
even to Sallust. 
Our concern, however, is not so much with 
theguilt of Catilinets private life as with his guilt in con-
nection with the conspiracy. In one paragraph Sallust gives 
us a complete summary of the v;hole affair: 
"Eis amicis sociisque confisus, Catilina simul quod 
aes alienum per omnis terras ingens erat et quod pleri-
que Sullanii milites largius suo usi rapinarum et vic-
toriae veteris memores civile bellum exoptabant, oppri-
mendae rei publicae consilium cepit. In Italia nullus 
exercitus, en. Pompeius in extremis terris bellum gere-
bat; ipsi consulatum petenti magna spes; senatus nihil s 
sane intentus; tutae tranquillaeque res omnes sed ea 
prosus opportuna Catilinae.n3 
There in brief we have the history of the origin of the 
conspiracy as Sallust sees it. But that immediately raises 
the question, how did Sallust see it? What is his attitude 
throughout towards catiline? vre know Cicero's motives for 
writing against Catiline; what were Sallust's? To answer 
these questions at all satisfactorily we must consider briefly 
some few events of Sallust ts life. 
Gaius Sallustius Crispus (86 B.C.-34B.C.) 
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had received as a youth a rather good education and so was 
enabled at an early age to enter upon a political career at 
Rome. In 52 B.C. he was elected tribune of the comn1ons; two 
years later, ho·wever, he was expelled from the senate by the 
censor Appius Claudius Pulcher. The following year Caesar 
reappointed him to the quaestorship, and Sallust became 
once more a member of the senate. A new and significant phase 
of life had begun forhim. In the year 48 B.C. he was appoint-
ed commander of one of Caesar's legions in Illyricurn but was 
defeated by Octavius and Libo. His next appointment was 
equally disasterous. He was sent to Campania to quell a 
mutiny among the troops but was lucky to escape with hislife. 
At last in 46 he succeeded in distinguishing himself, by 
sailing to the island of Circina and seizing the enemy's 
stores. He was rewarded by Caesar with the appointment of 
the proconsular governorship of the province of Illyria and 
Africa. On his return to Rome he was tried for extortion 
4 
"but was acquitted doubtless through Caesar's influence.n 
It is maintained, but on doubtful authority, that he even 
gave Caesar a bribe of two million sesterces. He was, at 
any rate, immensely wealthy and could afford to retire from 
political life to the magnificent gardens that bore his name 
and were afterwards the personal property of the emperors. 
It is not at all difficult to understand 
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why Sallust should have revered the name of Caesar. Nor is 
it difficult to understand why, when Caesar was assassinated 
and Sallust was seeking a theme for his ·pen, he should have 
chosen this means of repaying his dead benefactor. One way 
of glorifying Caesar was to clear his na~e of the charges that 
had linked him with the conspiracy of Catiline. One sure 
way of distracting attention from Caesar's name in this con-
nection was to magnify and enhance the part played by Catiline 
Whether Sallust really undertook the Bellum Catilinae with 
this intention is of course a mooted question. Many authori-
ties are inclined to believe he did. Mommsen for one is 
quite emphatic in his affirmation of the fact: nsuch an apolo-
gy is the ncatiline" of Sallust, which was published by the 
author a notorious Caesarian after the year 708 (46 B.C.) 
either under the monarchy of Caesar or under the triumvirate 
of his heirs evidently as a treatise with a political drift, 
which endeavors to bring into credit the democratic party--on 
which in fact the Roman monarchy >:vas based--and to clear 
Caesar's memory from the blackest stain that rested on it; 
and with the collateral object of whitewashing as far as 
possible the uncle of the triumvir Marcus Antonius •••••••••• 
The circumstance that the adroit author keeps the ~pologetic 
and inculpatory character of these writings of his in the 
background, proves, not that they are not partisan treatises, 
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but that they are good ones." Despite the sympathies, then, 
that Sallust, as an avowed opponent of the oligarchs, might 
feel for Catiline, he would of necessity be forced to treat 
him rather severely if he were to achieve his purpose of 
clearing Caesar's name. 
We must not, however, be unfair to Sallust 
and it is only reasonable to credit him with the moti ''e he 
himself tells us he had in mind in choosing this particular 
theme: "Igitur de Catilinae conjuratione quam verissime 
potero paucis absolvam; nam id facinus in primis ego 
memorabile existimo sceleris atque periculi novitate." 
He had just stated previously: "statui ~ gestas populi 
Romani Carptim, ut quaeque memoria digna videbantur, pre-
7 
scribere." This may well have been Sallust's chief reason 
for picking a.s his theme the conspiracy of Catiline for as 
Boissier poinfs out, among its other attractive features, 
Sallust ha.d been a personal witness of much that .he.d transpir-
ed, had received the confidences of Crassus and was on famil-
iar terms with Caesar. But roost important of all: 
"Mais· ~ qui lui convenait surtout dans ce sujet, 
ctest qutil etait dramatique, qu'il mettait aux prises 
des personages importants, qu'il lui donnait l'occas-
ion de tracer leur portrait, de les faire agir et 
parler de peindre les moeurs du temps, toutes 6hoses 
dans lesquelles il excellait et dont le public etait 
alors tres friand."8 
Assuredly all these considerations.would have weighed heavily 
with a man like Sallust, making as he was a bid late in life 
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for fame as a writer. 
But the motive here assigned and the one 
previously offered--his anxiety to clear Caesar's name--are 
by no means irreconciable. Sallust could take this theme 
as it was delighting in the opportunities it afforded his 
peculiar genius and still manipulate his materials in such 
a manner that Caesar would come through the ordeal unscathed. 
The only one who might suffer in the process was Catiline and 
that scarcely mattered since he was so notoriously guilty 
already. It would, moreover, heighten the dramatic tone of 
the work to enlarge the part of Catiline and intensify his 
guilt. We know for a fact that it was some such motive that 
led Sallust deliberately to antedate the conspiracy a full 
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year. If Catiline could be shown to have plotted against the 
state on his own initiative for over a complete year, there 
could be no earthly reason for dragging in the name of Caesar, 
and Sallustts purpose would have been achieved. 
No true estimate of Catiline, however, can 
ever be formulated unless we understand the motive that in-
duced him to take up arms against the government. Despite 
the fact that it is on precisely this point that the whole 
justification of the conspiracy stands or falls, it is a. 
question that has received but scant treatment. That Cati-
line had some good reason for rebelling, we cannot doubt. 
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No man in his right mind ever took up arms against his ovm 
country out of sheer perversity. ft~d we have the best of 
evidence that Catiline was not a madman. On the contrary, 
it has been declared "that a re-examination of the evidence 
from an unprejudiced point of view shows that there is a 
remarkable consistancy in Catiline's various remarks con-
cerning his program. On no important plank of his platform 
does he contradict himself, nor does any action of the con-
spirators waver in purpose. They all knew v'hat they were 
about and they had a real program in which it can be shown 
10 
by Ciceronian evidence they honestly believed. n ·what this 
program was it is our intention to discover. 
In a quotation from Sallust previously cited 
we saw that the reason there assigned for Catilinets plan 
to overthrow the government wasthe fact that his own debt 
was enormous: naes alienum per omnes terras ingens erat"; 
and, secondly, that the veterans of Sulla were eager for 
war: "Sullanii milites ••••• civile bellum exoptabant." Clearly 
this cannot be the whole story. No man ever induced his 
fellowmen to join his conspiracy because he was heavily in 
debt and because thez were of a generally revolutionary char-
acter. As a matter of fact, this is refuted by the letter 
of Catiline to Catulus. That the letter was genuine we bBve 
no reason to doubt. It is evident that Sallust believed it 
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was genuine from the way he accepts it with the simple com-
ment: "earum exemplum infra scriptum est." In this letter 
which throughout breathes a tone of sincerity that is notably 
wanting in his other letters, Catiline explains to Catulus 
that he had undertaken this revoltion not because he was un-
able to pay off his own personal debts: "n2!!. c;uia aes a:lienum 
meis nominibus ,g possessionibus solvere n£!! Possem (et alien-
is nominibus liberalitas Orestillae suis fili egue copiis 
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persolveret)n. AnY other obligations could be met from the 
estates of Orestilla anQ her daughter. Catiline had, it is 
true, squandered enormous sums in his various trials and cam-
paigns for office but it is not unlikely that he had still 
some little left from his lucrative years as provincial gov-
ernor in Africa. If worst came to worst there was always 
Crassus to fall back on. 
Crassus had already tried Catiline's ser-
vices in the first conspiracy. He would be willing to go 
many lengths to retain them. He was at present financing the 
political career of Caesar. In his struggle with Pompey, 
however, he could probably get more advanta.ge out of Ca. tiline 
than he could out of the less tractable Caesar. We know, for 
a fact, that he was willing to go much further in his champ-
ionship of Catiline. According to the account of Sallust it 
was even believed that Cicero had instigated Tarquinus to 
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testify against Crassus in connection with the conspiracy in 
order to prevent Crassus from taking up their cause: "Alii 
Tarquinium 2: Cicerone immissum aiebant, ~ Crassus more suo 
suscepto malorum patrocinio ~ publicam conturbaret". P~d, 
adds Sallust, as if to remove the last shred of doubt on tr~s 
score: "Ipsum Crassum ego postea praedicantem audivi tantam 
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illam contumeliam sibi ab Cicerone impositamn. There was 
unmistakeably belund the whole conspiracy something more than 
the mere fact of Catilinets indebtedness. It was more than 
the case of a lone individual seeking redress from society 
at large for his ovm personal grievances. 
It would, however, be true to say that it w 
was this question of debt if anything that lay back of the 
whole conspiracy. That it was the whole problem of debt that 
was responsible for the outbreak and not any personal em-
barassment on the part of Catiline himself can be proven 
from·cicerots own words in his letters where he makes refer-
ence to the conspiracy in terms of money and debt alone and 
does not so much as mention the name of Catiline: 
nitaque me nunc scito tantum habere aeris alieni, ut 
cupiam conjurare, si quisqua~ recipiat, sed partim 
odio inducti me excludunt et aperte vindicem conjur-
ationis oderunt, partim non credunt et a me insidias 
metuunt nee putant se nummos deesse posse qui ex 
obsidione faenatores exemerit".l3 
Three years later writing t his brother Quintus in a more 
serious vein, he remarks not that his consulship has saved 
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the country but that it had saved the fortunes of the wealthy: 
"oui aut quod publicani sunt, ~ summa necessitudine attin-
gunt, aut,guod ita negotiantur ut locupletes sint, nostri 
consulatus beneficio se incolimus fortunas habere arbitran-
14 
tur." 
That Cicero knew well enough what lay behind 
the conspirators' action can be shown from "his cruel joke 
about frightening the conspirators with the urban praetor's 
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edict." The edictum here referred to was the mandate of the 
civil authority imprisoning the debtor in default of payment 
and confiscating his personal possessions. Whether this was 
an absolute right to the debtor's person or merely a limita-
tion of his liberty until the debt was paid, is a question 
that can have made little practical difference. It was in 
either case equally disastrous for the poorer classes. It 
was as a champion of these oppresses people that Catiline 
designed to appear. He says: npublicam miserorum causam pro 
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mea consuetudine suscepi." ~~ether he spoke the truth or 
not we have no means of knowing, save that these words were 
written in the face of an approaching doom to r~s friend 0. 
Catulus, by far the noblest of Catiline's acquaintances and, 
indeed, one of the most upright men in all Rome. Catiline 
could scarcely have hoped to deceive Catulus at this point. 
To the very end Catiline never wavered in 
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the declaration of his purpose. In his address to his troops 
before going into battle he still places the causes of the 
whole revolt on the bases of debt and its oppressions: 
npraeterea, milites, non eadem nobis et illis necessi-
tude impendet; nos pro patria, pro libertate, pro vita 
certamus, illis supervacuaneum est pro potentia paucor-
um pugnare ••••• licuit vobis cum summa turpitudine in 
exsilio aetatem agere, potuistis non nulli Bomae amiss-
is bonis alienas opes expectare; quia illa foeda atque 
intoleranda viris videbantur, haec sequi decrevistis."l7 
Long before this in the memorable meeting 
at Laecats house Catiline had fired the minds of the conspira-
tors by contrasting the poverty and debt in which they lived 
with the luxury and splendor of their oppressors: 
"Nam postquam res publica in paucorum potentium atoue 
dicionem concessit, semper illis reges, tetrarachae 
vectigales esse, populi, nationes stipendia pendere; 
ceteri omnes boni mali nobiles atque ignobiles volgus 
fuimus sine gratia , sine auctoritate eis obnoxii, 
quibus si res publica valeret formiriine essemus. Ita-
~ue omnis gratia, potentia, honos divitiae apud illos 
sunt aut ubi illi volunt; nobis reliquere pericula 
repulsas judicia egestatem", and further on: "cum 
tabulas signa toreumata emunt, nova diruunt alia aedi-
ficant postremo omnibus modis pecuniam trahunt, vexant, 
tamen summa lubidine divitias suas vincere nequeunt. 
At nobis est domi inopia foris aes alienum mala res 
spes multo asperior denique quid reli']ui habemus praeter 
miser am anima.m. "18 · 
A still more convincing argument,.however, 
that it was the oppressive measures enacted against the debtor 
class that induced the conspirators to revolt was the message 
sent by Manlius to Marcius Rex. This sincere and straight-
forward appeal from one soldier to another is the most reveal-
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ing document of all. Says Manlius: 
"Deos hominesque testamur, imperator nos arma neque con-
tra patriam cepisse neque C!UO periculum ali is facer emus, 
sed uti corpora nostra ab injuria tuta. forent qui mis-
eri egentes violentia atque crudelitate faenetatorum 
plerique patriae sed omnes fama atque fortunis expertes 
sumus. Neque cuiquam nostrum licuit rnore maiorum lege 
uti neque amisso patrimonio liberum corpus habere; tanta 
saevitia faeneratorum atque praetoris fuit."l9 
Cicero's joke about the "praetor's edict" was after all not 
quite so harmless. 
It is in this same message that ~ve finally 
strike upon what is probably the best explanation of the true 
genius cmd character of the conspiracy. ~i1anlius in ju.stifica-
tion for his taking up arms against the government appeals to 
the traditions and customs of their forefathers, who several 
times took up arms and seceded from the limits of the city 
when aroused by the arroga.nce of the magistrates. 
"Saepe maiores nostrum miseriti plebis Romanae decretis 
suis inopiae ejus opitulati sunt, ac novissime memoria 
nostra propter magnitudinem aeris alieni volentibus 
omnibus bonis argentum aere solutum est. Saepe ipsa 
plebes aut dominandi studio permota aut superbia magis-
tratuum armata a partibus secessit."20 
·Manlius appeals to the traditions of their forefa.thers on 
two counts, first, because of the great debt they had pa.ssed 
a decree whereby silver was paid in copper, end, secondly, 
they had taken up arms and vithdrawn from the city when their 
rights were not respected. He i'.-as referring to the seces~don 
of the plebians who threatened to withdraw from the city and 
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form an independent community unless the patricians granted . 
them certain rights. Three such secessions are recorded, the 
first to the Mons Sacer in 49 B.C. the second to the Aventine 
in 449 B.C. and the third to the Janiculum in 28'7 B. c. The 
fourth was to have been that of Catiline in 63 B.C. 
If this was Catiline's inteDtion in the be-
ginning we can readily see v.·hy the whole affair ended as it 
did in armed rebellion foredommed to fa.ilure before the super-
ior armies of the state. In a state not yet perfectly formed 
it had some chance of success, but in the highly organized 
and efficient Rome of Cicero's day it had none whatever. To 
men of tl~ genius of Cicero, Pompey, Crassus and Caesar it 
was but child's play to show up such a movement as an atter:,pt 
at treason, and crush it. This is, a~; we have seen, 'Nhat 
Cicero actually did. A not unlikely pa.rallel is: to be found 
in our OVI~ country. In the American Revolution the colonies 
were successful in their attempt to withdraw their allegiance 
from England. Had Carolina ci1osen to secede from the Union 
in those early subsequent years the attempt would probably 
have been successful. When she did make her bid she was too 
late. The forces alligned against her had been solidly mass-
ing all those years. So with Catiline. The forces against 
which he dashed himself were too firmly established. And 
fortunately so, for a victory for Catiline was by no means a 
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desirable thing. Some passing good he might have done but in 
the end he would have brought no lasting benefit to Rome. 
He would at any rate have fallen before the superior :might 
of either Pompey, Crassus or Caesar. 
We have now reached a stage in our investi-
gation of Catiline's guilt when we can call a halt and sum-
marize some of our conclusions. Enough of the evidence for 
and against Catiline has been sifted to enable us to pass 
some sort of judgment. Catiline did indeed plot against the 
state. The evidence for this fact, if "~Ne accept the evidence 
of Cicero and Sallust, is overwhelming. But to condemn Cati-
line categorically as the great~st rogue in ancient times--
the ordinary procedure in our textbooks--is to stray in an-
other direction equally as far from the truth. It may be the 
acceptable practice to paint Catiline in black for the sake of 
impressing the youthful student but it i!3 bad history and as 
long as there is question of truth then at least let us ern-
ploy some shade of gray. The cause of Catiline, it must be 
remembered has never had a pleader before the tribunal of 
history. We have seen how evilly he fared at the hands of 
Cicero. That Sallust treated him no better is perhaps the 
surest proof that Catiline had broken with Caesar and the 
popular party. For this reason rd.s cause has never been heard 
nfor all the authors of our historical sources were allied to 
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some degree with one party or the other, and naturally did 
not have a good word to say about Catiline or a program like 
his. Catiline's own party, on the other hand, being composed 
largely of the poorer classes and a few members of the upper 
classes who were either executed or silenced was completely 
21 
inarticulate." The ·world has never heard any version of 
Catilinets story but the one which flows from the lips of his 
enemies. 
One of the first conclusions VJe reached 
regarding Catiline was that his name has come to be falsely 
attached to the first conspiracy. His part in this affair 
was entirely subordinated to those played by Caesar and eras-
sus. His guilt, therefore , in this connection has been 
unjustly and unfairly magnified. Plutarch in his life of 
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Cicero sins especially in this regard. This first conspir-
acy v~as a simple bid for power by Crassus and Caesar and 
though Catiline does seem to have some share in the proceed-
ings he does not deserve the obloquy that would attach to 
him had he actually been planning an organized attack on the 
government through three continuous years. 
The next conclusion we reached was that we 
had to be extremely cautious in accepting wholly without 
question Cicero's testimony against Catiline. Cicero was 
clearly in this case a special pleader. In the language of 
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today "he was out to get Catiline." The speeches were 
written in the midst of a wave of intense popular reaction 
against Cicero for his unorthodox execution of the conspira-
tors when it was to Cicerots evident advantage to paint in 
as lurid as light as possible Catilinets personal character. 
For the same reason it was necessary that the dangerous ele-
ments in the conspiracy should be highly colored and ·exagger-
ated. One of the conclusions we reached here was that Cicero 
cleverly manouvered Catiline into a postion 1"1here the latter 
was forced to betray himself and leave the city. No matter 
what the designs of Catiline may have been until then, it 
was now a simple task for Cicero to construe them into a 
treasonous attempt on the state. Catiline could then be treat 
ed as an avowed public enemy and an army dispatched against 
him. Another conclusion we drew in this section \.','as that 
Catiline on the testimony of Cicero himself was not the to-
tally wicked character that he has been painted in the popu-
lar imagination. 
In viewing the evidence presented by Sallust, 
a like decision must be rendered as in the case of Cicero. 
Though Catiline stands to all appearances convicted still 
enough evidence in his favor has been found to justify a 
fairer and more generous treatment than that accorded by 
Sallust. For Sallust, too, was writing with a partisan bias. 
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If he was to clear his patron's name from guilt in connection 
with the conspiracy he necessarily head to be severe in his 
treatment of Catiline. He had a second motive for treating 
Catiline harshly if Catiline and Caesar, the recognized lead-
er of the popular party, had severed relations. For Sallust 
was the mouthpiece of the popular party. It has even been 
contended that Sallust had in mind ~hen he undertook· his 
writings the glorification of the popular party and its a.ims. 
Though Catiline may have had in mind nothing more treasonable 
to the state than an armed secession of his party from the 
city modeled on those of earlier days, yet beca.use such a 
movement would, at best, be seriously inconvenient for the 
two traditional parties, the Optimates and the Populares, 
these two tulited for the moment to crush him. Since Cicero 
was the speaker for the Optimates cmd Sallust of the Populares, 
it would be but natural that Catiline should suffer in the 
telling of the tale, especially since all our known facts con-
cerning the conspiracy derive from these two. 
All these considerations would, we believe, 
justify us in concluding that though Catiline did lead a 
movement against the government, yet, his actions might well 
demand a far more lenient interpretation than has generally 
been put upon them. That his movement was badly timed and 
his aims misdirected does not justify us in labeling him the 
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arch criminal of all times. Had he succeeded he might have 
been a hero. Only a few years later the ~reat Caesar actually 
did carry into efect many of the reforms that Catiline had 
advocated. 
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